3.1 funding obligations
It
is fundamental to this legislation that the taxpayer does not foot the bill for
any part of the system. Potential operators decide what they think the business
opportunity is worth and what charges they would make to recoup their costs.
They are entitled to understand what those costs are likely to
be.
3.1.1 all costs
of set up and operation fall to the operators
(a) apart from any official assistance outlined elsewhere in
this mandate, for instance in providing locations for public access terminals,
there is to be no expectation of public funding for any part of the system’s set
up or operation
(b) no outside party can be invited to fund part of the
system for anything other than a straightforward relationship with the operators
as outlined in this document
(c) any marketing and training materials will be funded by
the operators
(d) any dedicated civil service staff who’s work pertains to
the system may be charged – at cost basis – to the operators. This is likely to
include the function of reviewer as outlined in this document and the system’s
single entry point to government as described in this document.
(e) likewise the costs of the tender process may eventually
have to be repaid by a winning consortium. Government may wish to establish the
principle that no taxpayer funds whatsoever are spent on the
system.
(f) commitments in this section can not be
phased
3.1.2 widest
public access is the responsibility of operators
Any
citizen in the country of operation has a right to use the system in whatever
way they wish providing they are willing to allow the system’s charge to be a
part of their transactions. Lack of access to appropriate technology should not
be a bar to system usage.
(a) operators must fund a given number of terminals for
public access to the system in areas where there is believed to be low
availability of online access. The extent of the obligation must be made clear
in the tender document. A possible formula might be that the least affluent 10%
of the population are to be provided with access to a publicly available
terminal in the ratio of 1 terminal to every 500 adults
(b) operators may choose to make terminals available on the
premises of organizations, if so they must ensure those organizations are not
imposing restrictions or an ideology on users or linking their usage to any form
of proselytizing
(c) it is permissible for the terminals to be dedicated to
the system and not allow access to any other online services, alternately
operators may pool resources with, for example, libraries to allow shared
terminals where the percentage of time the terminal is used to access the system
is counted towards any allocation such as that stipulated in (a)
above.
(d) it is permissible to limit the time of any one user on a
terminal, particularly at peak periods
(e) any statistics about terminal use that are compiled are
to be published on the system’s information pages
(f) terminals have to be maintained. It is recommended the
operators are responsible for a weekly check of the terminal and its immediate
environment. They would be wise to set up a market on the system allowing anyone
to sell this service.
(g) it is permissible to charge a nominal sum for terminal
use after a period of free use of perhaps 12 months for each user
(h) it is intended that this provision lapse after a certain
period of the system’s operation as (i) awareness of the system increases (ii)
prices of home technology fall. Such a period might be five
years.
(i) operators are responsible for the removal or handover of
redundant terminals
(j) commitments in this section can be
phased
3.1.3
interfacing with the public sector obligations
Public sector purchasing is a huge prize for the system,
it should ensure a throughput of transactions that then generates multiple
further transactions. The costs of shifting public sector expenditure from the
offline world or other systems is to be borne by
operators.
(a) operators must fund and organize the integration of the
system into the public sector. This responsibility includes without limitation,
court systems, license issuing centres, public sector procurement systems and
banking infrastructure
(b) it is not reasonable that operators be expected to pay
for terminals in this context but system integration and additional server
capacity are to be provided with appropriate guarantees for the safety of
existing systems.
(c) training of public sector personnel is the responsibility
of the operators. They can not be expected to train every individual who will
have to use the system but should fund reasonable training for supervisors and
managers who will oversee its use within an existing public sector
environment
(d) commitments in this section can be
phased
3.1.4 non
charging transactions obligations
There are certain functions the service might be expected
to offer for which it is not permitted to charge. These need to be made clear
within the tender process.
(a) specified e-government functions may be required, for
example a registry of cattle sales for disease control purposes that is
automatically updated by any transaction through the system but can also be
entered by a farmer who may not be a system user but wishes to record a sale
made by other means.
(b) the system may be required to facilitate voting in
national and/or local elections or plebiscites by its users. The system would
need to show it could take in a vote for a list of options from a qualifying
user who was only permitted to vote once and that the votes would be accurately
tallied while preserving the anonymity of users. Integration with offline
processes to ensure no double voting would also be crucial.
(c) a “reverse supply chain” of notifications and collections
for recycling of used goods might be required with the items being traded having
negligible financial value.
(d) a market in training in system usage as described in this
document may be mandated as a no-cost market.
(e) inevitably there will be individuals who are banned from
the system by the courts after consistently unacceptable behaviour in
transactions. Because of the accompanying risk of economic exclusion, operators
may be mandated to run “rehabilitation markets” in which such people are
permitted to trade with each other, possibly for tokens that otherwise hold no
value, and so establish a track record enabling them to re-enter the main
markets.
(f) the system could run a controlled parallel economy for
the benefit of users. This needs to be managed so that the main economy is not
devalued
but could create enormous opportunity for low level trades in areas where there
was little economic activity.
(g) Government may take the view that the system should run
certain “social capital” functions such as enabling local networking without
users being required to pay
(h) commitments in this section can be
phased
3.1.5 training
in system use
Past
examples of national infrastructure have often created bewilderment followed by
a real desire to learn the benefits of the new service. For example, mass
“penny” postage was launched to a largely illiterate populace who quickly
adopted reading and writing now they had a reason to do so. Operators can’t be
expected to train the whole nation in using the system, but they can seed the
provision for doing so.
(a) there are many individuals who would benefit from the
system and may be keen to use it but are not sufficiently confident with
technology to do so. It is unrealistic to expect operators to fund individual
training for all these people. However a formula can be worked out by which a
core of trainers are inducted and funded for a set period at operator expense
and then train others who could be helped by a market on the system to sell
their services to any organization willing to help users into a new form of
economic activity.
(b) it is suggested this obligation expire after the first
two years of system launch to (i) encourage early take up (ii) reflect what
should be widespread knowledge of the system as it
develops
(c) commitments in this section can be
phased
3.1.6
Protection against system failure
It
is in any online system operators’ interests to provide adequate backup against
failure of all kinds. However, operators of the present system have a special
responsibility because of their national infrastructure
status.
(a) operators have to show they have funds sufficient for
system growth with usage and their need for funds will not hold up
expansion
(b) operators have to have funded sufficient back up against
technology failure as detailed elsewhere in this document
(c) the core consortium may be required to lodge a sum of
money with government which can be used as surety of compliance with the mandate
and timetable announcements. However, this should not be necessary if the
mandate ensures upfront expenditure such as that in section 3.1 with the only
means of return controlled as in this document.
(d) commitments in this section can not be
phased
3.2 controls on the
operators
Like
the operators of the national water supply or the national electricity network,
operators are held to levels of integrity, accountability and transparency far
exceeding a normal commercial enterprise. The ways they can raise cash from the
markets they operate are limited to protect users from “stealth
pricing”.
3.2.1
structural controls
(a) it is envisioned that the tender to operate the service
will be won by a core consortium of firms who can demonstrably provide the
finance plus build and operational expertise required. The consortium needs to
be a registered entity in the country of operation.
(b) no one who was involved in the process of drawing up or
awarding the tender for the system is permitted to be a manager of the
system.
(c) senior managers appointed by the consortium of firms that
win the tender to operate the system must be free of any interests in sellers or
buyers within the system above the level of individuals (it’s permissible for a
manager’s son to sell in the system but not a company of which he’s a
non-executive director or shareholder). The aim is to avoid any temptation to
have markets skewed towards the interests of any particular
user.
(d) the system’s technology is stand alone and not part of,
or driven by, any other core technology.
(e) the system can not be a brand extension of any additional
existing or future service. Its brand can not be extended outside of the system
itself except in the case of value added repackagers.
(f) the core consortium run the servers underlying the system
but are not permitted to operate any markets, this must be done by franchisees.
The aim is to create checks and balances between the operators and ensure only a
transparent commercial agenda is fuelling the system’s
development.
(g) it is envisioned that franchisees will have particular
expertise in the market which they run. Their duties are likely to include;
evangelising the market to individuals and organisations in their sector,
ensuring the most balanced contracts and grading requirements to allow the
market to grow, liaison with bodies concerned in that
market.
(h) the core consortium is likely to be multinational,
franchisees must be nationals of the country of operation.
(i) franchisees must put in their own, or borrowed funds, to
sustain their market sector.
They are not to be employed or under the direction of the core consortium
(beyond following the sort of rules implicit in a franchisee relationship).
Their return comes from a split in the earnings of their market agreed with the
core consortium. Like the core consortium they are forbidden from adding charges
on top of the standard transaction charge to transactions or creating market
entry costs in any way.
(j) it is unacceptable for one franchisee to dominate
anything other than the smallest market sector. Therefore, as a sector grows it
is to be split between franchisees. A formula standardising this might be that a
franchisee who has attained earnings of the equivalent of perhaps US$75,000 from
their market in the last 12 months has to offer a defined part of it up for sale
to a new franchisee.
(k) franchisees are not allowed to sell in the market they
operate or to have any improper interest in the welfare of a particular
seller
(l) franchisees are encouraged to interact with the industry
they serve and may be offered travel or other benefits by sellers and buyers,
such gifts must be declared in the system’s information pages by the
franchisee
(m) to ensure against consolidation of power within the
system franchisees have to be self-employed individuals and not
firms.
(n) commitments in this section can not be
phased
3.2.2 revenue
controls
Online markets raise cash in many ways. A recurring
business model involves attracting users with low transaction fees then
introducing “stealth charges” in the form of listing costs, fees for enhanced
placement, charges for display for example for adding a photograph to a
description and escalating post transaction percentages deducted from the final
price. None of this can be permitted in the system.
(a) there are no charges for market entry and only one
percentage mark-up factored into the price paid by each buyer in each
transaction in each market.
(b) operators must commit to a consistent percentage mark-up
for the duration of their concession.
(c) in some circumstances it will not be possible to charge a
percentage fee because the operator will not necessarily know the value of the
transaction. For example in very thin markets the system might revert to a
bulletin board format with deals concluded by email between users. In these
circumstances it is permissible to charge a flat fee for a set block of time
listing.
(d) other forms of revenue raising that have evolved for
online markets include charging for aggregated information about patterns of
transactions. This is expressly forbidden. Any such information generated by the
system is to be made public property immediately.
(e) operators are allowed to raise revenue by selling
consulting in how to build and operate services such as the system
because this is not in conflict with the need to maintain a neutral public
utility marketplace. Additionally, it benefits those who launch the first of
these systems and therefore take the most risk.
(f) operators are not allowed to sell consultancy in how to
buy or sell in the system or other marketplaces. That provision must be left to
outsiders.
(g) the system will hold funds for its users, both in their
accounts and in the form of escrow payments, and clearly there is potential for
revenue raising through treasury management. This is permitted provided full
protection of funds is in place. Operators would be wise to invest such cash
through the system’s own markets for financial functions.
(h) government may decide to allow the core consortium to
levy a fee on value added repackagers. This is not recommended because it
creates a revenue relationship with repackagers who will then become de facto
regulated. If the system’s return comes through a percentage mark up on
transactions and no extra costs are incurred by a transaction through a value
added service provider then it is already in the system’s interests that such
services thrive and promote usage.
(i) commitments in this section can not be
phased
3.2.3
transparency of reporting
The
system has its Information Pages where anything the operators need to get into
the public domain can be listed and indexed. The majority of users will probably
never look at these pages. But a niggling minority who believe the system might
be corrupt will and they are a valuable asset for more easy going users who
don’t have time to think about system integrity. Operators are held to account
through the disclosure of information.
(a) the system’s mandate, technical specifications and actual
code are all to be published and updated in real time on the system’s
information pages. Users’ ability to investigate any concerns about the system’s
operation are more important than operators’ commercial
secrecy.
(b) operators are responsible for reporting to their users on
expansion plans and forthcoming improvements to the service on the information
pages. It is suggested they be required to do this in the form of a report every
three months.
(c) operators and their staff, are entitled to a
“whistleblowers’ page” within the system’s information pages where any concerns
about the system’s integrity can be aired unvetted and anonymously but with the
reader knowing the writer had a valid staff or franchisee password at the time
of writing. Messages on this board may be moved to publicly available archived
pages but can not be erased. Each comment can have an adjoining response from
operators.
(d) any credible allegation that the operators are not
fulfilling terms of their mandate must be responded to publicly on the system’s
information pages within 48 hours
(e) operators have no right to commercial secrecy, day to day
accounts of the system are immediately in public view on the system’s
information pages
(f) all usage metrics compiled by the system are immediately
made publicly available on the information pages
(g) in the event of any form of court ruling being applied to
the system, for example a ruling that “all transactions in a certain market over
$5,000 are to be reported to state bodies” that ruling is made public on the
system’s information pages
(h) commitments in this section can not be
phased
3.3 system operation
obligations
3.3.1 the
system must enforce all legal requirements
(a) subject to government’s role as outline in section
2.2.6(a) of this document, operators must ensure any notification of a legal
requirement for market entry, authorization to purchase or entitlement to sell
are enforced by the system. Restrictions include age limits, proof of
entitlement to sell in a market or price controls such as minimum wage or other
form of price control.
(b) by default the system must assume a user is not entitled
to enact a particular trade or enter a particular market until they have proved
otherwise.
(c) new business rules ensuring compliance with new
legislation will be enacted at the exact time the new legislation comes into
force.
(d) commitments in this section can not be
phased
3.3.2 user
protection obligations
The
system is passive in its relationship to users but aggressively protects them
from outside interference.
(a) the only information the system knows about a user is
what that user chooses to tell it
– with proof when required
(b) any user can resign from the system at any time and
choose to have their entire file within the system irrevocably wiped
(c) users’ data can never be viewed by system staff . If the
system is ordered by courts to open a user’s file the contents are opened only
to the authorised representative of the judiciary, for example an
arbitrator.
(d) if a user’s data is ever opened on the instructions of
the courts, (a) the amount of information to be made available must be specified
for example “his last 5 transactions” or “any transactions to be in force in the
next 24 hours” (b) the timing, extent of data revealed and to whom revealed is
recorded by the software and an indelible record created for the user
concerned.
(e) the system has an entirely passive relationship with
users. Beyond navigation applied to screen displays it is not permitted to
attempt to deepen its relationship with users or “upsell” them in any way.
(f) users are entitled to devote minimal mindshare to the
system. It can not force its brand unduly into their usage experience nor
subject them to any intrusive information or images that is not essential to
completion of the specific transaction on which they have embarked. There is
information that the system needs to communicate, for example changes in system
contracts or the law relating to a transaction. This must not be overly
intrusive.
(g) displays of market information will ensure the data pool
underpinning the analysis is large enough to protect the identities of
individual users. An enquiry can not be framed so tightly that the sales of an
individual seller can be deduced for example.
(h) users must have a process to register a complaint about
the system itself, a “whistleblowers” page for users such as that outlined for
staff and franchisees in section this document must be provided
(i) the core consortium has a duty to publicly notify and
ultimately replace any franchisee who fails to comply with this
mandate.
(j) franchisees who have a concern about the core
consortium’s compliance with this mandate have a duty to post those concerns on
the “whistleblower page” described in this document.
(k) any seller can instruct the system in repackaged versions
of the system through which they do not want to be offered to
buyers
(l) basic principles in this section can not be phased,
additional protection can be phased
3.3.3
neutrality obligations
The
over-riding aim of the system is to ensure (a) its markets are open to the
widest possible number of sellers and (b) the best match is found for the needs
of each particular buyer.
(a) subject to legal qualification, the system is available
equally to any individual or entity in the country of
operation
(b) all markets treat any legal seller and any legal buyer
equally, there is no preferred status for any entity or individual
(c) all transactions are equal in terms of priority for
system capacity, the only permissible exception being emergency transactions as
defined in this document. However, automated enquiries
or enquiries from users who initiate unusually high amounts of processing with
no accompanying purchases may be downgraded.
(d) inevitably there will be subjective judgments made about
the structure of markets and system navigation. Operators are encouraged to make
common sense “editorial” assumptions about the user experience to avoid taking
up undue user mindshare by timorously presenting lengthy lists of options at
every stage. However, those decisions can be challenged on the “whistleblower”
pages and must demonstrably have been made with no other agenda than growing
system usage
(e) contracts within the system should contain only clauses
that enable both sides to have faith in the neutrality of the
contract
(f) basic principles in this section can not be phased,
additional protection can be phased
3.3.4
predictability obligations
Peace of mind for users who may be buying or selling in
markets beyond their normal expertise are critical to the system’s usefulness.
Different degrees of convenience can not be used as a way of favouring certain
types of transaction.
(a) the system is funded by a standard percentage mark-up on
each transaction it enables which is then deducted as funds are transferred from
buyer to seller. The percentage may change between transactions of different
values, it does not change between market sectors.
(b) the system must adhere to agreed performance metrics,
they are likely to include speed of; availability of log-in page, navigation
after log-in, return of priced results for a user’s enquiry and delivery of data
about market activity. The targets must be comparable with the best of search
engine speeds.
(c) the system’s design may not be changed radically but can
only evolve progressively. The benefits of a design change must demonstrably
outweigh the cost in terms of user mindshare required
(d) there will inevitably be structural and design issues
that need to change as the markets evolve. Rather than a constant trickle of
amendments it is recommended that operators adhere to periodic “change days”,
perhaps the first day of every quarter, when changes are Commitments in this
section can be phased in. Only urgent changes are to be made outside these
predictable days.
(e) users are not responsible for testing the system’s
functionality unless they specifically volunteer to work with beta releases.
Operators are responsible for ensuring only tested and working functionality is
made available within the main system.
(f) the system’s role as a technology innovator is secondary
to its need for reliability.
(g) basic principles in this section can not be phased,
additional protection can be phased
3.3.5
transparency obligations
Day
to day operation of the system has to factor in the need for total
transparency.
(a) there are only 3 classes of information within the system
(a) data available to anyone (b) data available only to the user to which it
pertains and (c) information that is not compiled. Operators only have access to
(a), there is no data which they alone can access beyond non-public
staff/franchisee details.
(b) the franchisee for each sector, staff details and all
details of the core consortium’s component parts and contact addresses are
published on the system’s information pages.
(c) operators have a duty to report any attempted political
or corporate interference immediately to users in the information
pages
(d) within reason, any credible body can be invited to
inspect the system’s core installations by the independent reviewer described in
this document
(e) commitments in this section can not be
phased
3.3.6
availability for repackaging obligations
Operation of the system has to include consideration for
the needs of those who are repackaging it.
(a) operators are free to patent or copyright their
inventions when creating the system but may not use that protection to charge,
or otherwise inhibit the possibilities, of value added providers. Any
intellectual property has to be made available to
repackagers
(b) all repackaging sites are treated equally; in terms of
processing requests on the main system for example
(c) the repackaging facility might be phased to allow the
system to establish stability before it is repackaged. For example a period of
12 months of operation might be allowed before the system has to be available
for repackaging.
3.3.7 dispute
resolution obligations
The
system has a unique relationship with the courts. As a condition of that it must
make every possible effort to resolve disputes before they reach the courts. The
leverage of an automated referral into the court system should persuade users
it’s not worth “trying it on” by denying their
responsibilities.
(a) the system has a duty to encourage resolution of disputes
between users without involving the courts. Dialogue and attempts to find then
implement a mutually acceptable solution must be enabled by the
software.
(b) operators must act on any reasonable recommendation by
arbitrators or others who resolve users’ disputes and may have identified
potential improvements in system contracts
(c) commitments in this section can be
phased
3.3.8
universality of display obligations
The
system’s outputs must be accessible to as many people as
possible.
(a) operators must consult with appropriate bodies and
demonstrate that their standard displays, or an easily switched variant, make
the system as accessible as possible to individuals with a variety of
disabilities
(b) the tender must make clear if operators are obligated to
provide the service in more than one language. It is recommended that services
for minority languages are left to repackagers to provide.
(c) compliance with basic access legislation is not
Commitments in this section can be phased, but additional programming can
be
3.3.9 security
obligations
Again, because of the special status of this system there
are considerations beyond the purely commercial when it comes to
security.
(a) operators are responsible for the protection of data
about users and transactions
(b) back up in the case of system failure is mandated,
likewise security of the back up
(c) operators are responsible for protecting users and the
system from malicious attacks
(d) it is recommended that operators be mandated to maintain
a manned control room for the system with remote access to core functions not
possible
(e) servers running the system, and any back up sites, must
be within the country of operation, operators are not mandated to publicly
reveal the location of either
(f) operators are entitled to argue for an exception to the
transparency obligations if data disclosed may be prejudicial to system
security
3.3.10
emergency capability obligations
A
mature system could be invaluable when something goes wrong. But only if that
functionality has been prepared in anticipation.
(a) the tender document must specify to what extent the
system is expected to provide 999/911 functionality. It could be for instance
used to summons an ambulance using technology adapted from the minicab market
and similarly capturing all details at the time of booking. Matching duplicate
reports of the same incident would be part of the functionality required. Such
transaction requests would be given priority for
processing.
(b) certain categories of users may be able to initiate
emergency transactions which are given priority of processing and may even be
permitted to pre-empt existing transactions. For example, a registered doctor
requiring a defibrillator in a hurry may be offered an emergency button which,
if activated, could lead to a nearby vehicle having its assignment cancelled and
replaced by delivery of the required equipment. The cancelled assignment is then
treated as a failed assignment with funds from the emergency services to cover
replacement.
(c) like broadcasting networks, the system can offer unique
functionality in a time of national emergency. It could for example; (a) cancel
journeys into a danger zone (b) mobilize available resources for evacuation (c)
issue passwords to users whose details met specified requirements on address or
professional status with lists of passwords made accessible to official bodies
for the purposes of allowing individuals through road blocks (d) mobilize the
services needed to cope with an incident at the expense of normal transactions.
The tender document must specify the extent to which this functionality must be
provided by the operators. There needs to be (a) a publicly accountable process
for government initiating this programming (b) protection of user data and
rights during the period of emergency (c) only the minimum powers required to
pre-empt normal market operations (d) a clear process for returning to normal
operations.
(d) the system has to have sufficient spare processing and
storage capacity to handle a surge in usage during an emergency.
A possible metric might be that the system must always have 100% spare capacity
in even its busiest minute of normal operation.
(e) programming that will only be enacted on the system at a
time of emergency may be exempted from the operators’ transparency commitments
if publication of such code may them limit its usefulness by making the system,
or processes it enables, vulnerable to attack
(f) commitments in this section can be
phased
3.3.11
obligation to provide official facilities within transactions
The
state plays a big part in many transactions. System operations have to take
account of that.
(a) subject to government inputs as defined in this document
the system must be capable of calculating the tax due on any transaction, adding
it into the price charged and then subtracting it at source for forwarding to an
official account with all details recorded for the users
concerned
(b) users are entitled to opt out of automated tax
collection
(c) users who do choose automated tax collection on their
sales are entitled to accounts of sales within the system; the accounts compiled
by the system and formatted as required for immediate submission to the tax
authorities
(d) the system must comply with any official registers of
transactions, gun sales for example and provides whatever certification it is
permitted to issue to users in such transactions
(e) commitments in this section can be
phased
3.4 obligations in case of
non-compliance with legislation
Everyone needs to be clear what happens if the system is
not fulfilling the terms of the mandate.
3.4.1 notice of
failure and period of grace
(a) operators and public need to know that the system
continues to comply with its mandate throughout its life. It is recommended that
a government appointed independent reviewer produces a six monthly report,
possibly a month after the system’s own report to users as outlined in this
document. This report will draw on the “whistleblower pages” as outlined
elsewhere in this document and any pertinent information received by the
reviewer. In its summary this report must either (a) confirm the system is
operating as expected (b) warn of areas of concern where operators need to make
changes before the next reviewer’s report (c) issue a final warning to operators
that they are not complying with substantial elements of the mandate and must
make immediate changes (d) revoke the operators’ concession.
(b) the reviewer is able to impose sanctions on the system if
it fails to comply with the mandate and does not act on warnings. They should
take the form of micro-payments made to either (a) users affected by a
particular problem (b) all users equally (c) a randomized selection of
individual users.
(c) commitments in this section can be
phased
3.4.2 the
system’s physical assets revert to the state in case of failure
Take
on the business opportunity of running national infrastructure and you have to
appreciate your obligations to provide the service. If you fail you are not
allowed to pull the service arbitrarily because too many people and businesses
are dependant on it.
(a) the independent reviewer is entitled, in extremis, to
appoint a replacement consortium to run the system on an interim basis for
perhaps 12 months while a new tender process is arranged, it is the duty of the
reviewer to publicly ensure such a consortium is constantly in place in case
this contingency arises.
The interim consortium must continue to charge the standard transaction fee and
work with existing franchisees subject to (this document - sacking
franchisees).
(b) the interim consortium must comply with all the terms of
this mandate and are not permitted to profit from their status as interim
consortium except through the acceptable revenue permitted to
operators
(c) the state is not to benefit financially from a handover
to a new core consortium. Bidding consortia must acknowledge they will be given
substantial assets from the ealier consortium and reflect this in the rates to
be charged to users.
(d) commitments in this section can be
phased
3.4.3 seamless
handover is mandated
(a) if the operators demonstrably fail to comply with their
mandate and are about to lose their concession, a smooth handover with continued
protection and minimal disruption for users becomes the paramount
concern
(b) the original consortium is not allowed to use its control
of the system, relationship with franchisees, intellectual property, business
relationships or supplier contracts to impede a handover to new
operators
3.5 duration of
the obligations
Operators need to know how long their obligations last to
enable business planning for the tender.
(a) all obligations last as long as the accompanying
benefits specified in section 2.
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