2.1 benefits to be awarded to the
operators
2.1.1 state
help in establishing identities of users
The system can not function adequately if populated by
users with disposable identities. Users who wish to trade that way are free to
use alternative services. The state will provide reasonable assistance to any
citizen or entity in the country of operation that wishes to prove their
identity for the purposes of registering on the system.
(a) state agencies (possibly post offices) will sign users up
on proof of identity, this is funded by operators. Operators are also free to
fund alternative routes
(b) organisations such as Companies House in the
UK will provide a code for bona fide registrants
to immediately start using the system, again this is at the expense of
operators
(c) public sector bodies will be registered by the
state
(d) the extent of government’s commitments to enable
establishment of identities may be phased
2.1.2 automated
access to courts
As
public infrastructure, the system is allowed an automated relationship with the
court system. In practice this means the software can refer disputed
transactions to an appropriate court clerk who will ensure they are then
processed in the normal way with the court’s decision input back into the system
which may then take, objective, action such as downgrading a user. The key
concept is that a user’s record on the system is akin to the status of their
driving licence and its permission to use the national road system. If you break
the rules of the system you are awarded the equivalent of penalty points by the
courts system.
(a) the software makes every attempt to resolve any dispute
between users (see later in this document) but , where it can not do so, it is
enabled to refer cases into the national court system, funded by money held in
escrow for that transaction or its own central fund, the judgment of the court
system is then input directly back into the system, this can include specific
rulings on downgrading of either party involved which the system will enact
(b) because of the danger of a backlog of cases creating
uncertainty in the system the courts will adhere to an agreed timeframe for
producing at least a first assessment of each case
(c) commitments in this section can be
phased
2.1.3 interfacing
with licensing authorities
Government, directly or indirectly, issues countless
certificates allowing us to perform certain functions or attesting to our
desirability over uncertified sellers. All of these need to be made effortlessly
compatible with the system so any certificate holder can enter any appropriate
market on the system and instantly prove their status as a certificate holder.
(a) all state issued licences to individuals or entities that
enable them to perform a particular function can uniquely be confirmed by the
system. Examples include driving licences, teaching authority and other
practicing qualifications, fire certificates for premises, vehicle
roadworthiness certificates and gun ownership certification.
Technology required for this will be funded by the operators (see this document)
but staff time, stationery and other incidental costs will be provided by the
state bodies
(b) Legislation will eventually mandate that even
non-statutory bodies issuing qualifications will include provision for system
users to prove their status as holders of that
qualification
(c) Commitments in this section can be
phased
2.1.4 public
sector expenditure goes through the system
With
upwards of 30% of GDP in developed countries coming from public sector
expenditure, government can play a key role in “pump-priming” transactions on
the system. As the system opens up public sector expenditure to new suppliers,
levels of flexibility and unique precision in purchasing. It is in the
taxpayer’s interest that it performs this function.
(a) all public sector expenditure will progressively move
onto the system unless it can be shown that demonstrably better value is enabled
elsewhere
(b) public sector purchasing will be broken into the smallest
possible units of demand at the lowest levels to drive competition among the
widest possible range of sellers; big and small
(c) public sector staff who wish to work through the system,
for example to take example of its flexibility, will be encouraged to do so;
that may mean allowing them to sell their services in the private sector some of
the time if they wish
(d) commitments in this section can be
phased
2.1.5 legal
protection for the system
Uncertainty about the legal status of the system would
hinder its growth and usefulness. Government needs to give the system the
special recognition awarded to other public infrastructure appreciating that it
is operating as a minimal public utility rather than a value adding
straightforwardly commercial operation.
(a) operators are entitled to clarity about their own legal
liabilities and any legal limits on the system’s growth
(b) beyond an obligation to update contracts for particular
types of transactions as markets evolve, the system has no counterparty status
in any transaction between its users, nor is it responsible for any claims made
by its users
(c) government indemnifies operators against any antitrust or
competition rulings regarding the system’s unique status as a national system,
including those from external bodies (for example, European Law)
(d) the only legal obligations on the system are to comply
with the terms of its mandate as enshrined in the tender and all laws pertaining
to the wider economy, there will be no specific legislation during the period of
concession aimed at curtailing the system
(e) it is a specific crime to attempt to corrupt the system
programming
(f) commitments in this section are not phased, the legal
context needs to be clear for the operators from the start
2.1.6
legislative encouragement of the system
Government could use legislation to grow the system, for
example by de-regulating markets that could function much more flexibly on such
a system. However, this is to be balanced by a need to protect alternative ways
of trading.
(a) government recognizes it has a role in encouraging the
low level, localized transactions which the system aims to
enable
(b) many sectors will require deregulation to allow even the
smallest and most transient seller to bring their resources to market. Obvious
examples include; coach travel, insurance provision, land use, minicabs,
restrictions on operating a business from a home address not to apply to
individual sellers on the system and provision of overnight accommodation in
private homes. In such markets the system’s own regulation, embedded in its
contracts for each transaction and possibly escalating according to the grade of
seller, can progressively take over from blanket rules.
(c) government recognizes the advantages to all concerned of
using the tax system to encourage sellers currently in the hidden economy into
using the system
(d) commitments in this section can be phased
2.1.7
permission to operate as a limited bank
With
small purchases constantly flowing through the system it would impose
unnecessary overheads to force users to transact through external financial
institutions. The system itself should be able to move digital cash from user A
to user B, possibly holding it in escrow to ensure compliance, within its flat
rate transaction charge. Equally it must allow users who wish to access banking
facilities elsewhere to do so.
(a) transfer of funds between users needs to be a cost-free,
integral, part of the system. Users can opt to store digital value within the
system at no cost.
(b) the system must progressively enable users to access
accounts held elsewhere for sending and receiving value, it should not charge
for these transfers if they are part of a transaction although the external
institution is obviously free to do so
(c) there is to be no additional money processing charges on
top of the standard transaction charge as defined in this
document
(d) to protect the existing financial sector, the
functionality offered to users is limited; there are no sight deposits or other
creation of value except through deposits by users. Loans, investment and other
functions can only be provided through a market within the system at the
system’s flat rate between users, it is not a service to be provided by
operators or their favoured suppliers
(e) commitments in this section can be
phased
2.1.8 promotion
of the system by the state
Government has a significant role in informing the
electorate about the system and should commit to do so as part of the
legislation.
(a) wherever possible, the state will make space available
for public access terminals installed by the operators under the terms of this
document
(b) government communications channels have a role in
increasing public awareness of the system; such activity might include mailshots
with licenses and other official communications,
the curriculum of schools and colleges to include training about the system and
staff training in public sector occupations will include the system’s
operations
(c) interactions between the public and the state should
include adequate mention of the system as a way of fulfilling required
functions, for example promotion in doctor’s surgeries of the system’s markets
for healthcare services
(d) commitments in this section can be
phased
2.1.9
protecting the system’s identity
It
is in the interests of government, operators and users that the system’s unique
identity be protected.
(a) operators are allowed to register words and symbols
signifying a national and official status that would not otherwise be acceptable
as trademarks
(b) it becomes a crime akin to forgery of banknotes to pass
off any other service as being the system or having an untrue relationship with
the system
(c) government will make specified URLs available to
operators, (specifically those with a .gov suffix)
(d) government will ensure the system has a prime channel on
a par with national broadcasters within future technology licencing such as new
television delivery systems
(e) government will
not in any way claim the system as a service operated by the public
sector
(f) commitments in this section can not be
phased
2.1.10
uniqueness of these benefits
Bidders who are interested in running the system must be
clear what benefits they are getting so they can do their business planning
accordingly.
(a) it will be recognized that steps such as de-regulating
markets assist the growth of all online marketplaces, but operators are entitled
to the assurance that no other specific marketplace will be offered any of the
benefits described in section 2.1 above.
(b) commitments in this section can not be
phased
2.1.11 duration
of benefits
As
above, no-one can prepare a bid to fund and run the system without a
timescale.
(a) including any phased introduction included in the tender
document, the benefits awarded will be unique to the operators for a suggested
15 years from the day of the award of the tender
(b) this may be made subject to a renewal process at perhaps
the 5 year and 10 year marks. This would involve assessing the operator’s track
record against previously declared metrics and, if they were clearly falling
short, re-awarding the concession. The advantage of a renewal process is it
keeps operators focused on the wider objectives of the system. Key disadvantages
include (a) it runs the risk of proscribing the system’s growth trajectory
rather than allowing evolution to drive expansion (b) operators are likely to
curry favour with government as renewal approaches. It is in users’ interests
that there be a more detached and robust relationship. It is recommended that
there is a renewal process based on the percentage of the market flowing through
the system in sectors that are (a) driven by small sellers (b) genuinely local
in their demand (c) made up of a high volume of low value transactions. In
short: if the system is clearly enabling markets in babysitting, local journeys,
local tourism and the like it doesn’t matter that it is also growing a much more
lucrative forum for commercial property rentals.
2.2 the operators’ legal
entitlements
2.2.1 operators
have full entitlement to operate as a commercial venture within this
mandate
If
the operators get it right, providing interfacing, functionality and market
management that attracts huge swathes of the population to the system for which
they won a competitive tender then they are entitled to reap the
rewards.
(a) government will not impose any requirements about the
technology or business operations beyond mandating the spirit of obligations
within this document
(b) decisions about the structure of markets such as grading
levels are left to operators, inevitably such decisions will involve subjective
judgments; operators must be able to show (a) judgments were made in
consultation with bodies relevant to that particular market (b) their decisions
were motivated purely by a desire to grow numbers of transactions in the system,
not any aspiration to skew a market towards particular sellers or types of
transactions
(c) there will be no “penalty for success” operators will not
be subjected to windfall taxes or other financial requirements beyond those set
out in the tender. Operators are taxed as any other
corporation.
(d) Subject to constraints on user privacy and non harassment
of non-users operators are free to advertise the service as they
wish
(e) commitments in this section can not be
phased
2.2.2 operators
have all the powers they need but only to run a specific service
Running the system is not to be viewed as the launch-pad
into becoming a sprawling multi-faceted service provider leveraging the status
of system operator. Operators run the system, and that’s
all.
(a) this legislation intends that operators are fully
entitled to launch and grow a system of markets charging a fixed price with
minimal liabilities.
(b) the operators can not extend into additional services
including, without limitation, web search (beyond searching the system itself),
email provision (beyond allowing messages about transactions between users),
chat-room provision (beyond enabling conversations about transactions or their
aftermath), advertising services or internet service
provision.
(c) the markets may operate directly into the telephone
network,
on digital television, on any form of online device and inventions not yet
known, as long as this mandate is adhered to.
(d) commitments in this section can not be
phased
2.2.3 the
system is not an arm of the state
In a
developed country it’s unlikely this would become a big issue. But, for the
avoidance of doubt it’s important to clarify that, like a free press, the
system’s independence from government is a critical protection for users.
(a) beyond the ability to invoke emergency powers outlined in
this document, government has no special relationship with the system, it can
not access information or shape markets except through legislation passed in the
normal way
(b) all communications between government and system
management is to be transparent and reported openly by operators, it may be that
for example system management are lobbying for changes to the law and this must
be reported by management on the system’s information
pages
(c) records in the system can only be used for law
enforcement, tax investigation or other official purposes with an order obtained
in court, state bodies have no back door access to the
system
(d) registration on the system will never be made mandatory
for the fulfilment of any citizen’s interaction with the state.
Operators will offer a full interaction with the state so that, for example,
fines can be paid through the system by users with system flat rate fee
included, but there must always be other ways to pay.
(e) the system is not to be used as a means of control or
surveillance, for example enforcing a curfew by obliging its target to log on at
a certain time of day.
(f) commitments in this section can not be
phased
2.2.4 freedom from political
interference
Because the system is likely to be so responsive it needs
to be recognized there could be a constant temptation for government to attempt
to distort market activity, for example to create heightened activity in certain
markets preceding an election or to enforce a particular government scheme in
the system so that it appears a success. Operators are therefore entitled to the
protection that there will be no laws controlling trade within the system
uniquely, only those applying to the economy as a whole with which the system
must obviously comply.
(a) Operators must alert users through the system’s
information pages if they believe government is attempting to create patterns of
activity in the system solely for short-term political gain rather than in the
interests of users
(b) unless there is a similar mandate for the economy as a
whole the uptake of government introduced schemes in training, qualification,
work patterns or similar, can not be made mandatory within the
system
(c) unless the process for re-awarding the concession
outlined in this document is invoked, all software, hardware, connectivity
equipment and other possessions of the operators are unequivocally the property
of the operators and under their total control
(d) commitments in this section can not be
phased
2.2.5 operators
have a clear process for responding to attempted interference by
politicians
It’s
possible to imagine a scenario where politicians are putting pressure on a
mature system to take a particular course of action. That is not acceptable.
Operators have a duty to put users’ interests first.
(a) if operators believe government is breaking the spirit of
independence that should exist between the two parties they have a right to
directly inform their users of this, with details, on the system’s information
pages. Any resolution of the situation by government should likewise be fairly
reported.
(b) if politicians continue to act inappropriately towards
the system operators are entitled to go to court seeking to prove such
interference and ensure its discontinuation
(c) commitments in this section can not be
phased
2.2.6 operators
are not allowed to make judgements about any individual
transaction
The
potential legal issues arising from so many trades in so many marketplaces could
slow growth of the system and deter operators from markets with heavy
liabilities. If operators are employing large numbers of lawyers and setting
aside enormous sums for possible legal contingencies this legislation has
failed. Operators can be held responsible for system performance and compliance
with its mandate but should not have the burden of making legal judgements
better made elsewhere.
(a) government undertakes to indemnify operators against any
charges arising from misinterpretation of law by the system as long as
government’s interpretation of legal requirements have been followed. Any action
by a user against the system’s processes/rules is then an action against
government. The easiest way to achieve this might be that government provides a
unit within the civil service that is the dedicated point of communication for
operators.
Operators inform this unit in advance of forthcoming sectors they plan to launch
and are provided with the legal requirements of transactions in that sector. (“We’re going to launch the organic produce
sector, what compliance issues do we have to adhere to?”) Operators then
turn those issues into business rules based on what the system will know about
the transaction, the buyer and the seller and these are approved or changed by
civil servants within the unit and are then directly implemented.
Likewise, the unit is responsible for initiating updating of legally mandated
business rules in any existing markets on the system. All dialogue between the
unit and operators is made public on the system’s information pages for the
benefit of other online market operators who wish to code the same rules,
although not necessarily enjoying the same indemnity.
(b) as a principle, operators are not permitted to get
involved in individual transactions between system users or between a user and
the state beyond the provision of software based services available equally to
all authorised users
(c) to ensure system staff never have to make judgments in
individual cases, the court system will be available 24/7 to the system for
automated referrals with the appropriate degree of urgency. One example of the
need for this service is when a request is made to open the files of a user,
perhaps because their whereabouts urgently need to be traced and they are
thought to have purchased a journey or other location identifying service. When
such a request is received it can be automatically forwarded to a software hub
which can contact a representative of the courts system who can authorize, or
otherwise, the opening of a user’s details and the extent to which they are
revealed. Even the police are not permitted to order a file opening without this
step. Opening a user’s files on the system carries the same legal weight as
allowing a search of his home.
(d) as long as its mandate is adhered to, the system has a
right to minimal liabilities in its application of rules set by the state. As
far as possible this means the relevant public sector bodies undertake to input
such rules as long as an approved interface is provided by the system. For
example if payment of tax through the system is enabled (subject to the
provisions of this document) the tax authorities input details of relevant
calculation rules into a dedicated and secure interface provided by the system
which then applies those rules to all intended transactions. Any over or under
charge can not be deemed to be the operator’s responsibility unless it can be
shown there is a programming fault in the system.
(e) operators are not liable for any action or omission by
repackagers of the system
(f) commitments in this section can be
phased
2.2.7 the
system’s contracts are pre-eminent
A
key promise of the system is the simplicity and convenience it can bring to
purchasing from even the smallest seller. That would be undermined if sellers
are able to add post-transaction clauses to contracts or otherwise wriggle out
of commitments which would have appeared obvious at the time of
sale..
(a) as part of its underpinning of each transaction between
users the system must provide a contract clarifying the terms between buyer and
seller. Once accepted by both parties, that contract can not be supplanted by a
further contract between the two parties without the written consent of the two
parties.
(b) It must be clear to the purchaser in any transaction what
he is buying using a standard display protocol across the system. Thus he should
be aware of any further charges requiring completion of his transaction such as
delivery.
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