SECTION 1: The scope of the system

 

 

1.1 characteristics of the system

 

The intended system is envisioned as an online marketplace particularly suited to very small, localized, transactions particularly of services and irregular goods[1]. Such markets can only effectively be served by a system offering the following facilities in the markets it serves.

 

(a)    any potential seller can enter any market which they are legally entitled to do so instantly

(b)   the price of each seller in each transaction is constructed based on parameters of that transaction and the seller’s individual instructions

(c)    sellers must be able to exclude themselves from potential transactions on multiple grounds

(d)   buyers are able to input requirements then purchase immediately from any seller who meets their requirements

(e)    dishonest or persistently unreliable traders can be identified by the software which ensures they are separated from the reliable and honest

(f)     it is unlikely the above can be meaningfully achieved without some grading system applied to sellers, and possibly buyers, it must be entirely objective

(g)    every transaction is confirmed with a contract offered by the system

(h)    sellers can be contacted adequately by the system

(i)      transaction completion is monitored with a thorough process for resolving transactions that are in dispute between users

(j)     each user has full accounts and records updated with every transaction

(k)   the system maintains information pages where data about the system, either manually input or automatically compiled, is accessible by any internet user

(l)      detailed information about patterns of demand, supply and pricing is available to be interrogated by factors including locality and market sector by anyone

(m)  multiple sectors within the system interlock so small transactions can be bundled into personalised larger transactions at the behest of a buyer

(n)    funds can be transferred between buyer and seller with a period in escrow, at no extra cost, to ensure compliance

(o)   further functionality that should be progressively introduced includes without limitation; enabling of investment in market users, financial functions between users (eg lending, factoring, underwriting of transactions) a “community banking” function allowing any user to turn digital funds into cash for other users and vice versa

(p)   full functionality for middlemen and agencies who wish to sell through the system

(q)   pages of information about the current state of the system itself, they should include without limitation, current and historic transaction volumes and values, system performance metrics and other information as mandated in this document by the need for transparency

(r)     the ability for anyone to build a value added service repackaging the basic system

(s)    commitments in this section can be phased

 

 

1.2 the system can launch in any market, subject to serving the intended low level sectors

 

By enacting this legislation government is releasing benefits it alone can bestow to a system of marketplaces. It is doing so with the aim of creating new efficiencies in low level markets of small, localized, transactions. Operators have to be clear that these are the markets on which they must focus but, equally, they are entitled to grow the system as usage expands and that may include sectors outside the original focus. 

 

(a)    this legislation needs to protect against the possibility of the operators taking their powers and deciding to focus only on high value markets aimed at corporate customers. This can be contained by specifying which markets the system must serve but that imposes undesirable controls on the operators and lack of flexibility for users. Alternatively, the functionality defined above as part of the mandate aims to ensure the system’s obvious usefulness and immediate commercial opportunity lies in low level markets. Government may choose to set a maximum permissible transaction value[2] to keep operators focused on small sellers, but that makes counter-productive rule-bending behaviour by users likely[3]. A compromise might be a ruling that only a percentage of the system’s transaction can be above a permissible transaction value ensuring that, even if operators do pursue the corporate market, they also have to serve the low level sectors just as effectively[4]. A preferred option is to include a review of the system’s activities at a renewal point and make the average transaction size a key metric in this process.

(b)   The system is permitted to sell options to purchase bigger items[5] but the actual value of the item counts for the purposes of any formula intended to drive usefulness towards low value transactions

(c)    This obligation should not be phased beyond recognizing operators be allowed to serve higher value markets once they have established a service in sectors with lower average pricing.

 

 

1.3 accessibility for repackaging

 

It is fundamental to the neutrality of the system that (a) any citizen or firm in the country of operation has a right to access the basic system directly but (b) anyone can access the databases and processing power of the system with their own version of the system. This repackaged version can include (a) additional business rules, such as only displaying sellers who meet the criteria of the repackager (b) additional charges. An example might be a site offering babysitters who subscribe to a Catholic philosophy, buyers and sellers are still registered on the main system and are building up a track record within it but by choosing to enter through the repackaging site they are ensuring only like minded counterparties for their childcare needs.

 

(a)    anyone can repackage the system adding additional business rules of their own and making whatever charges they wish. Examples include a site selling painters and decorators who subscribe to the philosophy of a particular magazine, an online service that offers only its favoured overnight accommodation sellers for buyers or a supermarket repackaging a local deliveries market to automatically include their stores as points of purchase for shopping requirements. All transactions go from the value added site into the databases of the system with results output into the value added site.

(b)   repackagers are entitled to own all aspects of their relationship with their customers, the system has responsibility only for the user’s chosen relationship with the underlying system

(c)    beyond adding its standard mark-up, the system can not make any additional charges for repackaged transactions

(d)   operators have no control over who repackages the system

(e)    operators themselves are not allowed to offer repackaged versions of the main system

(f)     the legislation may allow a window of time before repackaging is permitted to let the system stabilise and minimise technical complexity (12 months perhaps)

(g)    repackaging can include call centre offerings based on the system and any other form of technology a repackager wishes to use

(h)    the system has no entitlement to branding on repackaged sites but must provide a logo if asked

(i)      all application details required for repackaging must be made publicly available by operators

 

 

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[1] Broadly, irregular goods are anything that doesn’t have a barcode, for example; organic produce, home made comestibles and hand made greetings cards.

[2] The equivalent of US$100 might be such a figure.

[3] An example would be sellers of overnight accommodation forcing buyers to purchase in blocks of three nights when they want to book a two week stay.

[4] It may for instance be that only a maximum 20% of the system’s transactions are allowed to be in markets within which the median transaction value is above US$100. (A more sophisticated and responsive formula can easily be imagined.) Operators may seek high value sales but can only enable them if there is a parallel commitment to low level transactions. To ensure the system is truly free to grow in the direction of maximum usefulness it may be that government pledges to a review at perhaps the three year mark with this formula abolished if it is clear the system has driven itself adequately into low level markets. Such a process is undesirable because it puts the system at the mercy of government for discretionary benefits which might make management less robust in resisting political interference, however there seems no other ways of clarifying the extent to which the system must serve markets made up of low level transactions which is where the need for such a system is greatest.

[5] For example it could allow a house seller to offer “purchased holds” of perhaps 48 hours during which an interested buyer has bought the right, but not obligation, to purchase the property at a particular rate.